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It's amazing what you can learn about modem divorce law from
Nicholas Copernicus and Johannes Kepler. Copernicus was the 16th
century churchman who dared to suggest that the sun, not the earth,
lies at the center of the solar system. Kepler was the early-17th cen-
tury mathematician whose three laws of planetary motion provided
the foundation for modem cosmology. Neither of these pioneers
had a clue what he was doing.
Arthur Koestler wrote a book about these remarkable people and
their wondrous bumbling: The Sleepwalkers. His thesis:
[A]ll cosmological systems, from the Pythagoreans to Coperni-
cus, Descartes, and Eddington, reflect the unconscious
prejudices, the philosophical or even political bias of their au-
thors; and from physics to physiology, no branch of Science,
ancient or modem, can boast freedom from metaphysical bias
of one kind or another.... The history of cosmic theories, in
particular, may without exaggeration be called a history of col-
lective obsessions and controlled schizophrenias; and the man-
ner in which some of the most important individual discoveries
were arrived at reminds one more of a sleepwalker's perform-
ance than an electronic brain's.1
A study of recent procedures, decisions, and statutes in Maine di-
vorce law suggests that nothing has changed since Copernicus.
Koestler could have written the same book just by attending a di-
vorce hearing in any Maine court or reading Skelton v. Skelton.2 We
bumble along without a clue where our divorce law is headed and
only later-sometimes a long time later-do we turn around and
realize what we've done. That's my thesis: that we can learn a lot,
and save a lot of embarrassment, by studying Koestler's thesis.
I start with a description of that eminent sleepwalker, the timid
Canon Copernicus. Copernicus never wanted to overturn the Ptole-
maic theory of the universe-the idea that the sun, all the planets
and all the stars revolve around the earth. Rather, he wanted to
improve on it. In order to simulate better the ancient Greek theory
that the universe must operate on a system of perfect circles and
1. ARTHUR KOESTLER, THE SLEEPWALKERS: A HISTORY OF MAN'S CHAN1NO
VISION OF THE UNIVERSE 11 (Arkana Penguin Books 1989) (1959). Those portions
of THE SLEEPWALKERS that appear in this Article are reprinted by permission of the
Peters Fraser & Dunlop Group Ltd.
2. 490 A.2d 1204 (Me. 1985).
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uniform motion, he proposed that the earth revolves around the
sun. He would have been horrified to think that his simple sugges-
tion is now deemed the death knell of the ancient cosmological as-
sumption that humankind is the exclusive focus of Universal Intent.
I make no pretense of originality in this or any other section of the
article in which I cite Koestler extensively; I simply present
Koestler's point of view because I want the reader to understand
how confused the purported giants of cosmology really were.
I then turn for comparison to the common practice of Maine
courts to require testimony at all divorce hearings. It's a small
point: We regularly engage in a time-consuming and meaningless
formality for which there's no sensible justification. But it in-
troduces my larger theme: family law in Maine is encrusted with
anachronistic and purposeless formalisms to which we obediently
adhere because, to all appearances, we aren't conscious of what
we're doing. Like Copernicus, we revere the rituals of the past, no
matter how flawed.
While on the subject of rituals, I broaden the inquiry to ask why
we even need lawsuits in divorce. Divorce is the only field of civil
law I know of that requires litigation to resolve a non-dispute.
Given the facts that more and more people are avoiding divorce by
never getting married at all, and that litigation and budgetary pres-
sures are rendering judge time ever more precious, it seems both
futile and inefficient to require those people who do get married to
file a ritualistic lawsuit to end their relationship. As with any con-
tract, partnership, and multiple ownership of real estate, the dissolu-
tion of a marriage shouldn't require litigation unless the parties
disagree about the result.
I turn next to alimony, a pillar of divorce law that is saturated
with anachronism. Our Law Court's most recent description of the
purpose of alimony adopts a view of the law from the virtually pre-
historic period when women lacked fundamental liberties and slav-
ery was constitutional. The methodology the court employed to
reach this conclusion was identical to that which Johannes Kepler
used when, ignoring his own recent discovery of the laws of plane-
tary motion, he persisted in trying to impose a frivolous geometric
aesthetic on the universe. Not to be outdone, our legislature got
into the act by passing an alimony statute that is as useless a guide to
alimony as geometry is to the solar system.
Finally, I address the overriding question of our time for divorce
law: Why do we offer some people remedies that we withhold from
others for the sole reason that they never married? The "ideal fam-
ily" is a sociological dinosaur; marriage isn't a preeminent norm
anymore. So why do we continue to discuss and develop rules of
law that apply to a decreasing number of our citizens? If we would
only wake up to the realities around us, we wouldn't.
1996]
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Well, I say "wouldn't" but I suppose that's unrealistic. I ought to
say "shouldn't," because if history proves anything, it proves that in
divorce, as in astronomy, we stubbornly resist change. We will con-
tinue to repeat the same threadbare rituals because we don't, or
can't, reflect on what we do. We're sleepwalkers.
II. THE CANON COPERNICUS
Nicholas Copernicus realized that Ptolemy's view of the solar sys-
tem didn't work very well:
[I]t did not fulfil the basic demand of [Aristotle] that each
planet should move with uniform speed in a perfect circle.
Ptolemy's planets move in circles, but not with uniform veloc-
ity. "Having become aware of these defects, I often consid-
ered whether there could perhaps be found a more reasonable
arrangement of circles... in which everything would move
uniformly about its proper centre, as the rule of absolute mo-
tion requires.
' 3
So he proposed a different arrangement that "solves 'this very diffi-
cult and almost insoluble problem' in a manner much simpler than
Ptolemy's ... :
1. That the heavenly bodies do not all move round the same
centre;
2. That the earth is not the centre of the universe, only of the
moon's orbit and of terrestrial gravity;
3. That the sun is the centre of the planetary system and
therefore of the universe;
4. That, compared to the distance of the fixed stars, the
earth's distance from the sun is negligibly small
5. That the apparent daily revolution of the firmament is due
to the earth's rotation on its own axis;
6. That the apparent annual motion of the sun is due to the
fact that the earth, like the other planets, revolves around the
sun .... 5
Copernicus had no idea that he was being revolutionary, not a suspi-
cion that he was deflating Aristotle. His object was to improve on
Ptolemy, to move the solar system closer to the Aristotelian concept
of perfection than Ptolemy had been able to do. In other words,
Copernicus was trying to be more Aristotelian than Ptolemy. "If
Aristotle had stated that God created only birds, Canon Koppernigk
would have described homo sapiens as a bird without feathers and
wings who hatches his eggs before laying them."6
3. KOESTLER, supra note 1, at 148 (citation omitted).
4. i
5. Id.
6. 1& at 215.
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The Aristotelian belief that the universe operated on a system of
perfect circles and uniform motion with the earth at its center was
nonsense. It was a prerequisite to mankind's appreciation of that
fact that mankind had to be willing to move the earth off the center
of the solar system. Copernicus held the key to that discovery in his
hand, but he was so anchored to the past that he couldn't use it. So
was everyone else. It took another century for anyone but a handful
of non-astronomers to understand the implication of Copernicus's
idea.
How much like Copernicus are we? Do we hold keys to dramatic
change without realizing it? Do our traditional biases blind us to
present reality? That's the inquiry of this article.
A. Divorce Hearings
Rule 80 of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, which controls
procedure in all actions for divorce and the determination of paren-
tal rights and responsibilities, provides that "[n]o judgment ... shall
be entered in an action under this rule except after hearing . .,"
Most judges in this state interpret that as requiring sworn testimony.
Although some sort of factual presentation is necessary in most pro
se cases, because the court has to prepare the judgment in most such
cases and has to know what to put in it, most judges don't distin-
guish pro se divorces from counselled ones. The result in uncon-
tested, counselled cases is testimony by attorney: one of the lawyers
presents the grounds for divorce and the settlement terms with lead-
ing questions to which the client provides predictable answers. It
goes like this:
"You've filed for a divorce from your husband on the
ground of irreconcilable differences, right?"
"Yes."
"And you believe that your differences with your husband
are irreconcilable, that there's no hope of rebuilding your mar-
ital relationship, and that a divorce is best for both of you,
right?"
"Yes."
"And there are no children of the marriage, right?"
"Yes."
"And you and your husband have reached an agreement
about the settlement of all of your affairs, which you have re-
duced to writing, correct?"
"Yes."
"And the terms of this agreement are to be included in the
judgment that the court issues but the agreement itself is not
to be merged with that judgment, right?"
7. I& at 217.




"The answer is 'yes.'
"Okay: yes."
"But there's no collusion between you and your husband to
obtain a divorce, is there?"
"We've agreed to it, if that's what you mean."
"The answer is 'no.'
"Okay: no."
"Now, you've agreed that he's getting the BMW and in re-
turn he's agreed that you're getting the Mercedes station
wagon, right?"
"Yes."
"He's getting the Augusta National life membership and
you're getting the condo at Hilton Head, right?"
"Yes."
"And each spouse is to claim exclusive ownership of the
pension that that spouse has been earning at his or her em-
ployment, right?"
"Uh, I don't know-is that what we agreed to?"
"Yes it is."
"Okay."
"So is the answer to the previous question, 'Yes'?"
"Yes: yes."
"And all of the rest of your personal property goes to the
person now in possession or control of it, right?"
"Yes."
I kid you not. Complicated divorce settlements (especially those
with minor children) can take time to present; several such hearings
in a row can take lots of time.
Nothing in Rule 80, or in any other rule of civil procedure, re-
quires such a time-consuming process. Rule 80 requires a "hear-
ing," not a "testimonial hearing." Nothing in any of the other civil
rules says that a hearing has to be testimonial. Only "trials" require
"the testimony of witnesses [to be] taken orally in open court.... ."
Nothing in the rules calls a "hearing" a "trial."'" The testimonial
divorce hearing in a counselled, uncontested case, in fact, conveys
9. M.R. Civ. P. 43(a); see also M.R. Civ. P. 77(b).
10. There is abundant case law that states that a "hearing" is an evidentiary pro-
ceeding. See 19 WoRDs AiD PHRASES 243 (1970). However, under the Rules of
Civil Procedure the term "hearing" contemplates proceedings that are not eviden-
tiary. See M.R. Civ. P. 12(d):
(d) Preliminary Hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (1)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and
the motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be
heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the





little or no information to the presiding judge; the judge patiently
awaits the conclusion of the testimony in order to sign the judgment
that the attorneys have prepared and agreed to present. It's a mere
ceremony, a ritual that consumes time.
So why do judges insist on this time consuming ritual? Because
it's time-honored. This continued practice derives from the 1959
Law Court decision in Dionne v. Dionne." In that case the parties
sought to introduce as evidence of the grounds for divorce (cruel
and abusive treatment) a transcript of testimony from a previous
trial that described how the husband had hit the wife with his fist.
The trial court granted the divorce on the ground of cruel and abu-
sive treatment, but the Law Court reversed because the manner of
proof of the ground for the divorce was inadequate:
A divorce can be granted only upon the causes authorized
by law and upon satisfactory proof. Because of the interest of
the state in maintaining and preserving the marriage relation,
it virtually becomes a third party in all divorce proceedings.
"The State having a most important interest in the marriage
relation is a party to the divorce proceeding just as much as
the parties themselves, and, not like other contracts, the con-
tract of marriage cannot be dissolved by the mere consent and
agreement of the parties...
Furthermore... there is always some danger that continued
practice along the lines followed in this case might in some
case lead to collusion or omission or concealment of pertinent
facts.
12
There: we hold testimonial hearings in all divorce cases because, in
1996, the State has as much of an interest in every single marriage as
the parties do themselves and because we need to stand resolute
guard against the peril of collusion. Either that, or it's because we
haven't bothered to think about why we do what we do since Elvis
was in the Army. 3
11. 155 Me. 377, 156 A.2d 3931 (1959).
12. I& at 378-79, 156 A.2d at 394 (citations omitted).
13. See, eg., Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and
Benefits of the Economic Justification for Alimony. 82 GEo. L. 2423. 2424-25
(1994) (footnotes omitted):
[NV]hile the fault-based divorce system emphasized the importance of pre-
serving the marital unit, the no-fault system focused on effectuating the
desire of one or both spouses to end their marriage. Without a societally
imposed duty to continue the marriage, justifying financial obligations that
survived divorce became problematic.
Maine adopted no-fault divorce in 1973 with the addition to ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 691 (West 1981) of divorce for irreconcilable differences. If Professor
Singer is correct, it has been over 20 years since Maine abandoned the idea that the
State has an interest in preserving marriages.
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I've heard of four reasons why we should have testimony in un-
contested divorces, none convincing. First, it is said that the divorce
statute requires the court to confirm that the parties have adequate
grounds for divorce. It doesn't: it only states what the grounds
are.' 4 Second, it is said that we need to prevent fraud. But testi-
mony isn't necessary to prevent fraud: unsworn falsification by any-
one is a crime,' 5 fraud on the court by anyone is punishable by
contempt,' 6 and fraud by an attorney carries additional sanctions
through the Board of Overseers of the Bar. 7 Third, I am told that,
because of the surpassing duty of the courts to oversee the best in-
terests of children, courts should always take testimony to find out
what divorcing parents have planned for their kids. If so, the con-
trolling statute doesn't say so: it expressly permits the parties to
agree about their children out of court, and requires evidence only
14. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 691(1) (West 1981) states:




D. Utter desertion continued for 3 consecutive years prior to the com-
mencement of the action;
E. Gross and confirmed habits of intoxication from the use of liquor or
drugs;
F. Nonsupport, where one spouse being of sufficient ability to provide
for the other spouse, grossly or wantonly or cruelly refuses or neglects to
provide suitable maintenance for the complaining spouse;
G. Cruel and abusive treatment;
H. Irreconcilable marital differences; and
I. Mental illness requiring confinement in a mental institution for at
least 7 consecutive years prior to the commencement of the action.
15. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 453 (West 1983) states, in pertinent part:
1. A person is guilty of unsworn falsification if:
B. With the intent to deceive a public servant in the performance of
his official duties, he
(1) makes any written false statement which he does not believe
to be true ...
2. Unsworn falsification is a Class D crime.
Sworn affidavits must be filed regarding children and child support; unsworn state-
ments of assets, liabilities, income and expenses, indicating marital and nonmarital
property, are required in all divorce cases in which a division of property or an
award of spousal support is sought. M.R. Crv. P. 80(b) and (c).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332, 1340-41 (9th Cir. 1981)
("Making [unsworn] misrepresentations to the fact finder is inherently obstructive
because it frustrates the rational search for truth.") (criminal contempt); United
States v. Griffin, 641 F. Supp. 1556 (D.D.C. 1986) (civil contempt).
17. The Board of Overseers of the Bar is the entity that enforces Maine's Code of
Professional Responsibility. Me. Bar R. 4. In pertinent part, the Code states that,




when the court considers rejecting the parties' agreement to share
parental rights and responsibilities."i
Fourth, and most important, we need to protect people, especially
women, from overbearing. The argument is best presented by an
illustration: a woman, sick of her domineering husband and scared
of his retaliation if she resists him, might agree to forgo alimony and
her share of the marital property just to end her relationship with
him. If she gives up her marital property and alimony, that's unjust,
and we should prevent injustice. Requiring the parties to attend a
hearing in court helps do that, because the judge who presides over
the hearing can intercede if it looks like bad stuff might happen.
Assuming for the moment that we should prevent such injustice in
all divorces, we don't need testimony in every case to do it; a sensi-
tive judge can ferret out such unfairness without testimony. Nor
does it seem a wise use of increasingly scarce judge time to guard
against that exceptional case by establishing a rule that requires
judges always to listen to fully-counselled divorce clients testify in
the manner described above.
But most importantly, if we're going to use the courts to prevent
injustice in divorce, we have to broaden our horizons, because di-
vorce itself is becoming a decreasingly available remedy. These days
fewer people marry; more merely cohabit without marriage. If in-
justice is our quarry, we will have to hold testimonial hearings when-
ever couples decide to end their cohabitation, wedded or otherwise.
To return to our previous example, if the woman decides to leave
after a five-year cohabitation rather than a five-year marriage, she's
giving up half of the remedies that she'd have if she were a wife:
alimony isn't available to her but she could still lay claim to her
interest in the parties' property if she came to court to fight it out (in
a suit in which the court does not have "a most important inter-
est"). 19 If she brings suit, she goes to trial unless she can settle; but
if she settles we don't require any hearing (let alone testimony) to
protect her from injustice. We just enter the stipulated judgment, or
the dismissal, as requested.
Should we extend to her the protection of a mandatory, testimo-
nial hearing? Of course not. We recognize that (1) we don't have
the time for the explosion of hearings that would occur if we did,
18. 19 ME. REv. STAT. Am. tit. 19, § 752(6) (West Supp. 1994-1995): "Where
the parents have agreed to an award of shared parental rights and responsibilities or
so agree in open court, the court shall make that award unless there is substantial
evidence that it should not be ordered." Id. (emphasis added).
19. See 59A Am. JUR.2D Partition § 11 (1987):
Although partition is sometimes defined in terms of the partition of real
property, it is now the well-settled rule that a cotenant of personal property
has a right to have it partitioned... if partition is possible, and, if not, to a




and (2) given the nature of the hearing, with leading questions and
predictable answers, it's a waste of time. Why then should things be
different in divorce? Why in divorce, unlike any other kind of civil
lawsuit, do we need in-court testimony to resolve a settled case?
Because we always have.
Which brings me to three points of conclusion. The first is the
narrowest and, I hope, the most obvious: testimony in all such cases
is a time-consuming charade, mandated not by statute, not by rule,
and not by common sense.
The second is that we don't need hearings at all in divorce cases
unless there's a dispute. The fact is that divorce is a civil lawsuit, and
you don't have to hold hearings to end civil lawsuits. We know that;
that's a key to change and we hold it in our hand right now. All we
have to do is use it: amend Rule 80 to drop the need for a hearing in
uncontested divorces.20 If we don't, we ape Copernicus: anchored
to tradition, we ignore the realities that are staring us in the face.
Once we recognize that, my third point is only inches away: we
don't need to require people even to file for divorce unless a dispute
is anticipated. We've reached a fork in the road: because unwedded
cohabitation is becoming as common as wedded, we need to estab-
lish a consistent policy. Do we treat unmarried couples as business
partners, who can settle their affairs privately, or as cotenants to real
estate, who can end their cotenancy by filing a deed and don't have
to sue for partition unless they can't agree? Or do we treat them as
husband and wife and require suit before they can end their rela-
tionship? I prefer the former (not only for the reasons discussed
above but also because requiring suit to end cohabitation is
unadministratable21), which means that as unmarried cohabitation
increases, the practice of requiring suit for divorcing couples only is
becoming anomalous. There's no reason to require suit in divorce
cases unless the parties fail to agree. Divorce, like every other civil
issue, should come to court only because the parties are in dispute.
Does it make sense to limit court proceedings to the resolution of
disputes? Well, of course it does: that's what court proceedings are
for. So why do we still make an exception for divorce? Is it because
we need to preserve marriages? Surely Dionne v. Dionne' deserves
less respect than it does formaldehyde. Is it because we need to
preserve families and because making the dissolution of relation-
ships arduous helps do so? If so, we're wasting our time. "Families"
20. ME. R. Civ. P. 80(j)(2) already provides that the parties may avoid a hearing
on a motion to amend a divorce judgment if they "under oath certify to the court
that there is a stipulated judgment or amendment and no hearing is necessary."
21. We lack a statute like ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 551 (West 1983),
which renders bigamy a crime, to provide an incentive to register the termination of
the relationship.
22. 155 Me. 377, 156 A.2d 393 (1959).
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are parents and children, but the parents are not necessarily mar-
ried: "Today the term 'family' is no longer attached exclusively to
conjugal or nuclear families comprising a husband, wife, and their
dependent children. It is applied to almost any grouping of two or
more people domiciled together."' A fact of life in the 1990s is that
the 20th century concept of the ideal family-"the nuclear fam-
ily"-has passed:
Lasting for only a little more than a century, this family form
emphasized the male as "good provider," the female as "good
wife and mother," and the paramount importance of the fam-
ily for child rearing ....
In the 1960s, however, four major social trends emerged to
signal a widespread "flight" from both the ideal and the reality
of the traditional nuclear family: rapid fertility decline, the
sexual revolution, the movement of mothers into the labor
force, and the divorce revolution. 4
When we talk about preserving "the family," we mean preserving an
ideal that was disappearing thirty years ago. Nowadays we don't
even try to "preserve" all families; only families with married par-
ents have to engage in the divorce process before the parents can
start relationships with different partners (and, as long as they never
23. SThVEN Mmnz & SUSAN KELLOGG, DoM"Esnc REVOLUTIONS: A SocIAL
HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMIy LIFE xiii-xiv (1988).
24. David Popenoe, The Family Is in Decline, in THE FA ILY IN AMERICA
(David L. Bender et al. eds., 1992). See also Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking
Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Prem-
ise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv. 879, 880-81 (1984) (footnotes
omitted):
Although the premise of the nuclear family underlies the legal norm of
parental autonomy, an increasing number of children do not live in tradi-
tional nuclear families. In 1982, twenty-five percent of children under the
age of eighteen in the United States-over fifteen and a half million chil-
dren-did not live with both natural parents. One authority estimates that
by 1990 this figure will grow to forty percent. The reasons for this phenom-
enon are familiar. More and more parents obtain divorces, resulting in sin-
gle parent families or, as divorced parents remarry, step-families. An
increasing number of parents never marry. Some parents abandon their
children; others give their children to temporary caretakers; and still others
are judged unfit to raise their children, who are then placed in foster
homes.
Id.
In a recent book entitled BARREN IN THE PROMISED LAND, Elaine Tyler May
discusses why so many alternatives to the heterosexual nuclear family have recently
emerged. Those alternatives include lesbian motherhood and married and unmar-
ried childlessness. A confluence of changing social trends and expanding medical
technology has permitted individuals to define reproductive happiness on an individ-
ual basis, splintering the homogeneous family ideal of the post-World-War-Il-era.
ELAINE TYLER MAY, BARREN IN THE PROMISED LAND (1995).
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try to remarry, nothing requires even that25). Parents who have not
married, however, need not come to court unless they can't agree
about what to do with the kids. So preserving families or the family
tradition cannot really be our goal.
Do we make an exception to the normal no-dispute-no-litigation
rule for divorce because the courts, as the traditional protectors of
children, must always oversee the termination of relationships in-
volving minor children?26 If so, we fail badly. We limit our over-
sight to divorces. If we are to be true to our public duty, we must
extend mandatory oversight to all families, unless, of course, that
concept of public duty is obsolete.
Do we do it because there's no alternative way to record the end
of marriages? Assuming that we need to,27 we could make one: the
same town office that issues marriage licenses could register di-
vorces. But that would require the cooperation of the legislature.
Do we do it to avoid inflaming the legislature? Now, there's the
rub.
Copernicus wrote a book in which he explained his theory of the
solar system.28 He refused to publish it for about thirty years, how-
ever, "because he was torn by doubt regarding his system, and knew
that he could neither prove it to the ignorant, nor defend it against
criticism by the experts."2 9 Ironically, the ignorants and the experts
whom Copernicus feared were, according to Koestler, intellectual
allies:
The inertia of the human mind and its resistance to innovation
are most clearly demonstrated not, as one might expect, by the
ignorant mass-which is easily swayed once its imagination is
caught-but by professionals with a vested interest in tradi-
tion and in the monopoly of learning. Innovation... evokes
25. Maine's statutes prohibiting adultery (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 101
(West 1983)) and fornication (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1551 (West 1983))
were repealed by P.L. 1975, c. 499, § 5 (effective May 1, 1976) and P.L. 1975. c. 499,
§ 7 (effective May 1, 1976), respectively.
26. See Pendexter v. Pendexter, 363 A.2d 743, 748 (Me. 1976) (DuFresne, C.J.,
concurring):
Public policy is of prime consideration in all procedures relating to di-
vorce and it is most important that the judicial process within delegated
legislative authority be given such flexibility as will allow implementation
of the State's role of parens patriae in promoting the best interests and
welfare of minor children, especially after the family unit has been severed
through divorce of the parents.
27. We don't need to in Maine-all we need to do is not require proof of divorce
upon application for a marriage license. But other states might not follow our lead,
so a person from Maine who seeks a marriage license in another state might need
proof of his or her Maine divorce.
28. NicoLAus COPERNICUS, COPERNICUS: ON THE REVOLUTIONS OF THE HEAV-
ENLY SPHERES (A.M. Duncan trans., 1976).
29. KOSTLER, supra note 1, at 156.
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the deeper fear that their whole, laboriously constructed intel-
lectual edifice might collapse.
30
The "experts" in Copernicus's era were the authorities of the Catho-
lic Church. Their "expert" counterparts in this era are the elected
representatives in the state legislature, who lack the churchmen's
"monopoly of learning" but many of whom share an unmistakable
interest in tradition. During the last presidential election, we were
reminded virtually ad nauseam about "family values." My simple
suggestion that we treat divorce in the courts like any other civil
matter may evoke a wail of protest from the traditionalists in the
legislature. So maybe my idea is presently doomed. But, unlike Co-
pernicus, at least I published it.
III. JOHANNES KEPLER AND THE GEOMETRIC UNIVERSE
On July 9, 1595, at the age of twenty-four, Johannes Kepler sud-
denly realized what his life's work was going to be: he was going to
prove that the universe is built around geometric figures. He was an
aspiring theologist and knew almost nothing about astronomy, but
that never slowed him down. Kepler believed that there are six
planets and he knew that there are five perfect solids, so there had
to be a relationship. He knew it.
The relationship was this: suppose that the orbit of Mercury, the
innermost planet, is a perfect circle (all of the orbits in this exercise
are perfect circles). Make the circle into a sphere whose diameter is
that of the circle. That sphere now fits exactly inside an enormous
tetrahedron (a pyramid the four faces of which are all equilateral
triangles) without an inch to spare. (You can't see either the sphere
or the tetrahedron any more than Kepler could-you have to imag-
ine them.) Now imagine an even-bigger sphere with the diameter of
the orbit of Venus, the second planet. The points where the edges of
the pyramid meet just touch the inner surface of the Venus sphere.
The Venus sphere just fits into a gargantuan cube, which itself just
fits into an Earth sphere-and so forth until each of the planets and
each of the perfect solids is accounted for.3
What's fascinating about Kepler is that it was in an effort to prove
this fantastic idea that he discovered his three laws of planetary mo-
tion,32 which provided Newton with the foundation for the theory of
30. Id. at 433.
31. The remaining planets were Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn; the remaining solids,
in the order in which Kepler assigned them to their respective planets, were the
octahedron, the dodecahedron, and the icosahedron. These solids are "perfect" be-
cause all of the faces are identical. For example, the tetrahedron is constructed of
four equilateral triangles, the cube of six squares, the icosahedron of twenty equilat-
eral triangles. Id. at 251.
32. The laws are:
1. The planets travel around the sun in elliptical orbits, and one focus
of each ellipse is the sun;
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gravity. Kepler was a successful alchemist, turning a leaden idea
into gold: in pursuit of nonsense, he discovered truth. And then he
didn't realize what he'd discovered. He hated and initially rejected
the idea that the planets' orbits are elliptical-they are, but ellipses
aren't perfect, and he scoffed at his oval-orbit idea as "only a single
cart-full of dung.",33 "Kepler set out to prove that the solar system
was built like a perfect crystal around the five divine solids, and dis-
covered, to his chagrin, that it was dominated by lopsided and un-
distinguished curves.",
34
He never got over his disappointment. TWenty-five years after he
first published his theory of the geometric universe he was still tout-
ing the idea: he had already discovered his three laws of planetary
motion, had fired the coup de grdce into the Ptolemaic universe, and
had established the foundations of modern cosmology, when he
wrote:
Nearly twenty-five years have passed since I published the
present little book .... It would be mistaken to regard it as a
pure invention of my mind (far be any presumption from my
intent, and any exaggerated admiration from the reader's,
when we touch the seven-stringed harp of the Creator's wis-
dom). For as if a heavenly oracle had dictated it to me, the
published booklet was in all its parts immediately recognized
as excellent and true throughout (as it is the rule with obvious
acts of God).35
Most astonishing of all, he still didn't understand what he had dis-
covered: in the notes he wrote for this second edition of his book he
never mentioned his first and second laws of planetary motion. "[I]t
was as if Einstein, in his old age, had been discussing his work with-
out mentioning relativity.,
36
What concerns us at this point is not how Kepler, in beating the
bushes for the fountain of youth, managed to stumble upon the ge-
netic cure for aging. We'll get to that later. Of greater interest here
is how Kepler induced himself to believe that the fountain of youth
even existed, thus justifying the search. What made him so sure that
his idea of the geometric universe was even worth pursuing?
The answer is Kepler's a priori reasoning, his belief that because
his idea sounded so good it had to be true. The proof of his idea
2. the planets don't move at a constant rate of speed, but "in such a
manner that a line drawn from the planet to the sun always sweeps over
equal areas in equal times."
3. "the squares of the periods of evolution of any two planets are as the
cubes of their mean distances from the sun."
Id. at 317 (first two laws), 399 (third law).
33. Id at 334.
34. Id at 267.
35. Id at 254.
36. Id at 267.
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"consists, roughly, in the deduction that God could only create a
perfect world, and since only five symmetrical solids exist, they are
obviously meant to be placed between the six planetary orbits
'where they fit in perfectly'. [sic] ' 3 7 Kepler described his confidence
this way:
Why waste words? Geometry existed before the Creation,
is co-eternal with the mind of God, is God himself (what exists
in God that is not God himself?); geometry provided God with
a model for the Creation and was implanted into man, to-
gether with God's own likeness-and not merely conveyed to
his mind through the eyes.
38
Kepler knew that he had observed "the Creator's secret thoughts
39
because only the Creator could have an idea as perfect as this one.
He was sure that he was right because he was sure that he was right.
"[Y]oung Kepler succeed[ed] in proving everything that he be-
lieve[d] and in believing everything that he prove[d]."4 °
A. Turning Lead into Lead
The same a priori reasoning (less the theological component) led
the Law Court to discover that the purpose of alimony is to provide
for an ex-spouse's post-divorce need. The proof that this was so was
the fact that the court had always believed that it was so.
The decision was called Skelton v. Skelton,41 and a unanimous
court offered this statement of the purpose of alimony:
Is alimony properly awarded to compensate a divorcing
spouse for her "years of service" in the past, or does it look to
the future, acting as a substitute for the loss of support en-
joyed during the preceding years, awarded in as large an
amount and for as long a term as circumstances make neces-
sary? The answer is clearly the latter.
A review of our decisions [from 1867 through 1980] shows
that while some of the factors relevant to the award have
changed, the essential purpose of alimony has remained the
"maintenance and support" of the payee spouse.... Alimony
is intended to fill the needs of the future, not to compensate
for the deeds of the past.
4 2
Alimony, in 1985, was need-based. Why? For the sole reason that
Law Court case law since the Civil War had said so.
I have no doubt that Law Court case law did say so, but I wonder
at the fact that the court's analysis ended there. Did it concern the
37. l at 256.
38. I& at 264 (quoting Harmonice Mundi, Lib. IV, Cap. I.G.W., Vol. VI).
39. Id. at 256.
40. Id. at 257.
41. 490 A.2d 1204 (Me. 1985).
42. Id. at 1207 (citations omitted).
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Justices that, after analyzing the history of Maine's family law, they
announced a theory of alimony that was identical to that held by
Maine's first legislators, over 160 years earlier? Here's what
Maine's first divorce statute said about alimony, in 1821:
[I]f the personal estate or money which the Court are by this
Act authorized to assign to the [divorced] woman ... together
with her dower in her husband's real estate, should be insuffi-
cient for her reasonable and comfortable support, then the
Court may allow her reasonable alimony out of her husband's
estate, so long as she shall remain unmarried, in the same
manner as alimony may be allowed to a woman divorced from
bed and board ... regard to be had, in making such allowance,
to the character, circumstances and property of the husband,
and the character and situation of the wife.... [W]henever a
decree of divorce from bed and board shall be made because
of the cruelty of the husband or of his utterly deserting his
wife, or grossly or wantonly and cruelly neglecting or refusing
to provide suitable maintenance for her, being of sufficient
ability thereto, the wife... shall be allowed out of his personal
estate such alimony as the Court shall think reasonable, hav-
ing regard to the personal property that came to the husband
by the marriage, and to his ability; but if there be issue living
at the time of the divorce, then the Court, with respect to...
granting alimony as aforesaid, may do as they shall judge the
circumstances of the case may require; and upon application
from either party, may from time to time, make such altera-
tions therein as may be necessary.43
(Divorce from bed and board, the precursor to legal separation, was
the preferred form of divorce because it didn't terminate the mar-
riage.) The purpose of alimony in 1821, then, was to provide the ex-
wife (or, in the case of divorce from bed and board, the estranged
wife) with "reasonable and comfortable support." As Skelton
noted, "[S]ome of the factors relevant to the award" have changed
since then-notably the elimination of the husband's fault as a pre-
requisite-but "the essential purpose" has remained, in the court's
view, constant and ever unchanged. 44
Skelton thus imposed on late-20th century society an early-19th
century concept of divorce law. The danger of doing that is illus-
trated by the fact that there is scarcely any other subject on which
sensible people would choose to do likewise. Consider the
following:
Cosmology: In 1821 people believed that God, a male, had
made man in His own image and had set him in Eden in the year
4004 B.C.45
43. P.L. 1821, ch. LXXI, § 5.
44. Skelton v. Skelton, 490 A.2d at 1207.
45. See JOHN N. WILFORD, THE RIDDLE OF THE DINOSAUR (1985):
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0 Science: Our first legislators were 100 years early for Harlow
Shapley's discovery that the solar system isn't at the center of the
universe46 and Edwin Hubble's that the center of the universe
may not be definable.47
Nearly all of earth's history remained unknown and largely inconceiv-
able at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Science had long since
discredited the pre-Copernican idea of a small, earth-centered universe.
thereby freeing people to think of the heavens in virtually limitless dimen-
sions. Chemistry, physics, and physiology were being pursued with fewer
restraints imposed by dogma. The way things were seemed fit for rigorous.
objective inquiry, but not the way things had come to be-not earth's his-
tory. Its study had yet to be liberated from the inhibiting influence of tradi-
tional belief. Its study, with a few as yet unappreciated exceptions, was
constrained by a concept of time woefully deficient in time.
... The Englishman who eventually made the first dinosaur discoveries,
and even the great Darwin, grew up with the firm belief that God had
created the earth and man and all the other species in the year 4004 B.C.
-' Those who wished to be more exact about such an important event
heeded John Lightfoot's refinement ... that, to be more precise, God had
created the earth at nine o'clock on the morning of Sunday the twenty-
third of October in the year 4004 B.C.
Id at 35-38.
46. See IsAAc ASIMOV, THE UNIVERSE: FROM FLAT EARTH TO QUASAR (1966):
[Harlow] Shapley ... determine[d] the actual distances of the various glob-
ular clusters and then [went] on to calculate the distance of the center of
the sphere over which they were distributed. The center of this sphere he
assumed to be the center of the Galaxy, and according to his figures it was
50,000 light-years (15,500 parsecs) from the Sun.
By 1920, then, the position of man in the Universe had again been al-
tered, drastically, and once again in the direction of increased humility.
Copernicus had shown that the Earth was not the center of the Universe,
but he had been certain that the Sun was, as part of the order of nature....
Now Shapley showed, quite convincingly, that this was not so, that the Sun
was far on the outskirts of the Galaxy.
In place of Ptolemy's geocentric Universe and Copernicus' heliocentric
Universe, we now had Shapley's "eccentric Universe", [sic] one in which
the Sun was "away from the center"....
Id. at 84.
47. See ALAN LIGHTMAN & ROBERTA BRAWER, ORIGINs: THE LWES AND
WORLDS OF MODERN COsMOLOGisTs, Harvard University Press (1990):
In 1929 [Edwin] Hubble made what was perhaps the most important dis-
covery of modern cosmology: the universe is expanding ...
... Galaxies are moving away from us because space is stretching uni-
formly in all directions, carrying the galaxies along with it. Hubble's dis-
overy..., gave strong observational support for cosmological models in
which the universe is uniformly expanding-but without a center to the
expansion.
Id. at 5, 9.
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o Politics: In 1821 women would be denied the right to vote for
another 100 years. 8
o Sociology: In 1821 women were esteemed principally for their
ability to bear children.49
* Religion: Religious beliefs of the early 1800s justified the de-
struction of the Native American tribes.5
o Ecology: Americans had not yet learned that it was both possi-
ble and undesirable for humans to cause the extinction of animal
species.
* Law: In 1821 slavery was constitutional.
48. The 19th Amendment to the United States Constitution, granting suffrage to
women, was ratified in 1920.
49. WILL DuRANT, Tim MANSIONS OF PHILOSOPHY (1929):
How profound a change the childless woman, or the mother of one child,
represents as compared with the woman of the past, stands out impres-
sively if we recall the horror with which both men and women once viewed
sterility. Until our century the respect in which a woman was held varied in
close correlation with the number of children she had borne.
Ic at 200.
50. See ROBERT M. UTLEY, THE LANCE AND THE SHIELD (1993). Utley writes:
White attitudes toward Indians in the time of Andrew Jackson and the
infant Sitting Bull centered on the idea of progress, a conception rooted in
the Renaissance and the Enlightenment but given a distinctively American
cast by the westward movement. Progress demanded the conquest of the
wilderness, an imperative fortified by God's command to "be fruitful and
multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it...."
Conquest of the wilderness meant destruction of the Indians. About the
means of destruction, however, there was disagreement. They could be
either destroyed outright by killing or, consistent with the tenets of pro-
gress, elevated from savagery to civilization. In either event, since the ge-
neric Indian (like savagery and civilization) was a white conception, they
ceased to exist.
Iat at 42.
51. See EVAN S. CONNELL, SON OF THE MORNING STAR (Harper Perennial)
(1984). Connell writes:
TWo [buffalo] herds, each so vast that no reasonable estimate was possible,
had darkened the plains, one above and one below the Platte. Fremont,
who traveled through this region in 1842, found himself surrounded-the
herd extending for several miles behind him and forward as far as he could
see.
Then came the gun-bearing palefaces.
Eight million-give or take a million or so-were shot for their hides
during a period of three years. Col. Dodge wrote that a land which used to
vibrate with life had become a putrid desert. The high plains stank with
rotten meat. By 1874 he saw more hunters than animals: "Every approach
of the herd to water was met by rifle bullets. . .
It is said that at the beginning of the twentieth century one buffalo
wandered across the prairie not far from a small town in Wyoming. The
townspeople hitched up their wagons and rode out to have a look. They
drove around the creature and stopped, the wagons forming a circle with
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Is it possible that the law of divorce should have changed since
1864 when Joel Bishop wrote:
The doctrine of alimony springs up necessarily out of the soil
of our law, by reason of the peculiar property relation which it
establishes between husband and wife. Upon the marriage,
the husband has vested in him all the present available means
of the wife, together with the right to claim her future earnings
and acquisitions. At the same time, the law casts upon him the
duty suitably to maintain his wife, according to his ability and
condition in life.... The husband cannot abandon his duty to
support his wife; therefore, when the law in any case judges
that she may live apart from him,. . . it must also judge that he
shall maintain her while so living.52
Divorce law like that ought to be little more than an antique curios-
ity. Not according to the court in Skelton: one of the precedents the
Justices cited-unabashedly-to illustrate the history of need-based
alimony in Law Court case law was a decision from 1867, a decision
that was contemporaneous with the quotation above,5 3 a decision
that preceded Darwin's theory of human evolution.54
I think it is fair to conclude that, as a statement of the modem
purpose of alimony, Skelton is useless. If the law is supposed to reg-
ulate human behavior, it ought, at least, to reflect human behavior.
Relying on the social tenets of the early 19th century as a basis for
divorce law at the threshold of the 21st century is as hopeless-and,
to those of us who employ divorce law regularly, as frustrating-as
citing Thomas Jefferson as an authority on modem race relations.5"
That should be obvious, but the Law Court did it anyway. Assum-
ing that the Law Court may be treated as a chronological singular-
ity, it did it because it fell into the same trap as Johannes Kepler:.
the buffalo inside. For a long time they stared at this legendary animal.
Then, because they could not imagine what else to do. somebody shot it.
Id. at 135-36.
52. JOEL PRNTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE § 369, at 295-96 (Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1864) (footnotes omitted).
53. Chase v. Chase, 55 Me. 21 (1867). The relevance of this decision to the mod-
em world may be measured by the following portion of the decision:
Perhaps the fact that impotence is a matter which ordinarily would be
discovered immediately after marriage, and the party aggrieved would be
able at once to annul the marriage, may have had some influence on the
legislation on this subject. But however this may be, we are satisfied that
alimony could not be legally decreed in this case.
Id. at 24.
54. CHARLES DARwIN, THE DEscmrr OF MAN AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO
SEx (New York, D. Appleton and Co. 1871).
55. See Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82
GEo. L. J. 2227 (1994). In Jefferson's time the husband had the right to all of the
income of the property because of the theory of coverture, which gave him the right
to claim all of the family's property. Id at 2229-30. The Law Court's reliance on its
own precedent extends coverture to the atomic age.
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The Law Court believed what it had proved and therefore proved
what it had believed. The court's closed system of logic blinded it to
the broader implications of its decision.
There would be no reason to criticize if the Law Court simply
admitted, "We aren't sure what the purpose of alimony is and we're
struggling to figure it out." A quick review of the literature on ali-
mony reveals a furious, nation-wide debate on the subject,5 6 so such
an admission would hardly undercut the court's credibility. How-
ever, the court refuses to admit anything of the kind and instead
continues to treat Skelton as definitive. 7 Sadly, absolutely none of
the literature that the alimony debate has generated advocates the
rudimentary 19th century concept of alimony 8 to which the Law
Court has affixed itself. In view of that overwhelming evidence of
change, the court's stubborn traditionalism is breathtaking.5 9 Just
like Johannes Kepler's.
56. See Jed H. Abraham, "The Divorce Revolution" Revisited: A Counter-Revolu-
tionary Critique, 9 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 251 (1989); June Carbone, Economics, Femi-
nism, and the Reinvention of Alimony: A Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REv.
1463 (1990); Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1989); Sally
F. Goldfarb, Marital Partnership and the Case for Permanent Alimony. 27 J. FAM. L.
351 (1988-89); Herma H. Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault
Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CiN. L. REv. 1 (1987); Joan M. Krauskopf, Theories
of Property Division/Spousal Support Searching for Solutions to the Mystery, 23
FAM. L. Q. 253 (1989); Twila L. Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege, and Dependency in
the Search for Theory, 82 GEo. L.J. 2481 (1994): Suzanne Reynolds, The Relation-
ship of Property Division and Alimony: The Division of Property to Address Need,
56 FORDHAM L. REV. 827 (1988); Jane Rutheford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income
as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 539 (1990); John C. Sheldon & Nancy D.
Mills, In Search of a Theory of Alimony, 45 ME. L. REv. 283 (1993); Jana B. Singer,
Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic Justifica-
tion for Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423 (1994); Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and
Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1103 (1989); Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Finan-
cial Interests on Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 130 (Stephen
D. Sugarman & Herma H. Kay eds., 1990); Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Be-
yond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEo. L.J. 2227 (1994).
For a brief but comprehensive history of the development of the debate about
alimony, see Singer, supra note 13, at 2424-28.
57. See infra text accompanying note 77 which discusses Noyes v. Noyes.
58. To say that alimony is based purely on need grossly understates the complex-
ity of the problem of alimony in the modern world:
Although the legal basis of alimony has always been somewhat murky, the
move to articulate a theory of alimony has become more urgent in light of
recent developments such as no-fault divorce, increased opportunities for
women in the workplace, and decreased governmental involvement in fam-
ily relationships. These developments have tended to undermine the tradi-
tional need and fault justifications for alimony. Scholars, in struggling with
the problem of creating a new theory of alimony, have explored the prob-
lem from a number of perspectives, including those of contract law, part-
nership law, law and economics, human capital theory, and tort law.
Perry, supra note 56, at 2781-82 (citations omitted).
59. There is this explanation for the Law Court's loyalty to Skelton: If the court
acknowledges that it doesn't know what the purpose of alimony is, it loses authority
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B. Turning Lead into Gold
The problem with Kepler's geometric model of the universe was
that it didn't work. Thanks to the precise and unimpeachable astro-
nometrical measurements of one Tycho Brahe, Kepler found this er-
ror: his prediction of Mars' orbit based on his own geometric theory
differed by eight minutes arc from the observations of Tycho.W
Kepler tried fixing his geometric model, but the result remained
unsatisfactory, so he tried a different approach. This time he de-
cided to prove that the planets operated on a system that correlated
to the harmonic intervals of the Pythagorean musical scale.6" Need-
for reversing trial courts' awards of alimony. When alimony decisions are reversed
without any theoretical basis for the appellate ruling, it's because the justices of the
Law Court merely disagree with the trial judge, not because the trial judge has vio-
lated any affirmative rule of law. See, e.g., Pongonis v. Pongonis, 606 A.2d 1055 (Me.
1992) (reversing a trial judge's denial of nominal alimony for abuse of discretion,
without citing any theoretical basis supporting that conclusion). The mere fact that
an appellate court disagrees with a trial judge's decision isn't normally supposed to
justify a reversal. See Smith v. Smith, 419 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Me. 1980) ("Absent a
violation of some positive rule of law, this [Law] Court will overturn the trial court's
decision ... only if it results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it
is instantly visible without argument.").
I would argue that it's better for the Law Court to acknowledge that its decisions
on alimony lack clear theoretical predicate, than for the court to prop up its deci-
sions with reference to a theory that lacks credibility.
60. KOESTELR, supra note 1, at 326.
61. Id. at 279. Koestler explains the Pythagorean "Harmony of the Spheres":
The Ionian philosophers had begun to prise open the cosmic oyster, and to
set the earth adrift; in Anaximander's universe the earth-disc no longer
floats in water, but stands in the centre, supported by nothing and sur-
rounded by air. In the Pythagorean universe the disc changes into a spheri-
cal ball. Around it, the sun, moon, and planets revolve in concentric
circles, each fastened to a sphere or wheel. The swift revolution of each of
these bodies causes a swish, or musical hum, in the air. Evidently each
planet will hum on a different pitch, depending on the ratios of their re-
spective orbits-just as the tone of a string depends on its length. Thus the
orbits in which the planets move form a kind of huge lyre whose strings are
curved into circles. It seemed equally evident that the intervals between
the orbital cords must be governed by the laws of harmony. According to
Pliny, Pythagoras thought that the musical interval formed by earth and
moon was that of a tone; moon to Mercury, a semi-tone; Mercury to Venus,
a semi-tone; Venus to Sun, a minor third; Sun to Mars, a tone; Mars to
Jupiter, a semi-tone; Jupiter to Saturn, a semi-tone; Saturn to the sphere of
the fixed stars, a minor third.
Id. at 31-32 (footnote omitted).
This ancient concept of universal harmony appealed greatly to Shakespeare, who
referred to it in these beautiful lines from The Merchant of Venice.
How sweet the moonlight sleeps upon this bank!
Here will we sit and let the sounds of music
Creep in our ears: soft stillness and the night
Become the touches of sweet harmony-
Sit, Jessica,-look how the, floor of heaven
Is thick inlaid with patens of bright gold,
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less to say, that didn't work either,62 so he commenced a decades-
long trial-and-error effort to explain the behavior of Mars. It was in
the course of this tribulation that he discovered (and then immedi-
ately ignored63) his important laws of planetary motion. He could
believe that geometry or music ruled the universe as long as he
lacked objective proof of their inadequacy. Yet when faced with
that proof from Tycho, he had to look for some other explanation
for the recalcitrant orbit. That search led him to his cosmologically
revolutionary, if aesthetically offensive and personally disap-
pointing, discoveries.
6 4
There's not the smallest orb which thou behold'st
But in his motion like an angel sings,
Still quiring to the young-ey'd cherubins;
Such harmony is in immortal souls,
But whilst this muddy vesture of decay
Doth grossly close it in, we cannot hear it.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Tim MERCHANT OF VENICE act 5, sc. 1, 1. 54-65.
62. See KOEsTrLER, note 1 at 279-80.
[A]s he began to compute the details of his cosmic musical box, he ran into
increasing difficulties.... The principal trouble was that a planet does not
move at uniform speed, but faster when it is close to the sun. slower when
away from it. Accordingly it does not "hum" on a steady pitch, but alter-
nates between a lower and a higher note. The interval between the two
notes depends on the lopsidedness or "eccentricity[sic] of the planet's orbit.
But the eccentricities were only inaccurately known. It was the same diffi-
culty he had come up against when he had tried to define the thickness of
the spherical shells between his perfect solids, which also depended on the
eccentricities. How could you build a series of crystals, or a musical instru-
ment, without knowing the measurements? There was only one man alive
in the world who possessed the exact data which Kepler needed: Tycho de
Brahe.
Id.
63. See id. at 403.
Kepler's Laws seem[ed to him] to have no particular raison d'etre. Of the
first he was almost ashamed: it was a departure from the circle sacred to
the ancients, sacred even to Galileo and, for different reasons, to himself.
The ellipse had nothing to recommend it in the eyes of God and man;
Kepler betrayed his bad conscience when he compared it to a cartload of
dung which he had to bring into the system as a price for ridding it of a
vaster amount of dung. The Second Law he regarded as a mere calculating
device, and constantly repudiated it in favour of a faulty approximation;
the Third as a necessary link in the system of harmonies, and nothing more.
Id&
64. See id. at 341.
The problem of the planetary orbits had been hopelessly bogged down in
its purely geometrical frame of reference, and when Kepler realized that he
could not get it unstuck, he tore it out of that frame and removed it into the
field of physics. This operation of removing a problem from its traditional
context and placing it into a new one, looking at it through glasses of a
different colour as it were, has always seemed to me [to be] the very es-
sence of the creative process. It leads not only to a revaluation of the prob-
lem itself, but often to a synthesis of much wider consequences, brought
about by a fusion of the two previously unrelated frames of reference. In
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Kepler's confidence in the geometric and musical solutions to uni-
versal mysteries derived from his tunnel vision; objectivity forced
him to broaden his horizons.
C. Turning Lead into Lead, Part 2
We ought to recognize something similar about our own divorce
law. As long as we believe what Law Court precedent says about
alimony, we may have confidence that our current alimony statute
adequately guides us. This is because the statute says that one of the
things a judge is supposed to consider when deciding whether to
award alimony is whether a spouse will need support after the di-
vorce.65 The statute confirms the theory that need is important. Yet
if we acknowledge that need is not an adequate basis for awarding
alimony, the statute loses its theoretical anchor. If, in other words,
we recognize that need-based alimony derives from the same kind
of tunnel vision that badgered Kepler, we have no choice but to
broaden our own horizons. It is then that we will recognize that the
statute is as useless a guide to alimony as geometry and tonality
were to the planets.
Need, as I have suggested, has not been shown to be an adequate
basis for a modem award of alimony. As alimony's theoretical
foundation, need did make a brief appearance in our statutes. It
then disappeared, however, for over 100 years, only to reappear re-
cently in a new and unpersuasive guise.
our case, the orbit of Mars became the unifying link between the two for-
merly separate realms of physics and cosmology.
Id. (footnote omitted).
65. Maine's alimony statute reads in pertinent part:
1. Factors. The court shall consider the following factors when determin-
ing an award of alimony:.
A. The length of the marriage;
B. The ability of each party to pay;,
C. The age of each party;
D. The employment history and employment potential of each party;,
E. The income history and income potential of each party;
F. The education and training of each party,
G. The provisions for retirement and health insurance benefits of each
party,
H. The tax consequences of the division of marital property, including
the tax consequences of the sale of the marital home, if applicable;
I. The health and disabilities of each party;,
J. The tax consequences of an alimony award;
K. The contributions of either party as homemaker,
L. The contributions of either party to the education or earning poten-
tial of the other party;,
M. Economic misconduct by either party resulting in the diminution of
marital property or income;
N. The standard of living of the parties during the marriage; and
0. Any other factors the court considers appropriate.
Mn. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721 (West Supp. 1994-1995).
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Our original divorce statute of 182166 described the purpose of
alimony in unmistakable terms. The purpose was to meet the wife's
post-divorce need. In 1847 the legislature revised Maine's statutes
but made no substitute changes to the alimony provisions.
67
Something significant, however, had occurred by the time of the
next revision in 1857 (omitting hereafter, for their decreasing rele-
vance to this discussion, the portions dealing with divorce from bed
and board):
When a divorce is decreed to the wife for the fault of the hus-
band for any other cause [than impotence] ... [t]he court may
... decree to her reasonable alimony out of his estate, having
regard to his ability; ... or instead of alimony, may decree a
specific sum to be paid by him to her .... 68
For the first time we had an alternative to alimony, a specific sum.
Yet, also for the first time, there was no mention of the purpose of
either alimony or the "specific sum." The concern for the wife's
"reasonable and comfortable support" had disappeared from the
statute. That omission held true for the next 100 years. In 1954, the
divorce statute read:
When a divorce is decreed to the wife for the fault of the hus-
band for any other cause [except impotence] . .. [t]he court
may ... decree to her reasonable alimony out of his estate,
having regard to his ability, .. . or, instead of alimony, may
decree a specific sum to be paid by him to her or payable in
such manner and at such times as the court may direct .... 69
This statute expanded the court's discretionary powers. Or maybe it
merely codified the expansive discretion that the court always had.
I don't know which, but the purpose of alimony remained unstated,
and to all appearances unchanged since Millard Fillmore. Nor did
the legislature's reticence change with its next revision of the ali-
mony statute in 1977:
The court may decree to either spouse reasonable alimony
out of the estate of the other spouse, having regard to that
spouse's ability to pay .... The court may order instead of
alimony, a specific sum to be paid or to be payable in such
manner and at such times as the court may direct.7 °
Alimony was now no longer the exclusive prerogative of women,
but we still couldn't tell what its purpose was. Need certainly wasn't
mentioned. Did that change with the next, and current, version of
the alimony statute?
66. P.L. 1821, ch. LXXI, § 5 (alteration in original).
67. P.L. 1847, ch. XIII, § 2.
68. P.L. 1857, ch. 60, § 6.
69. P.L. 1954, ch. 166, § 63.
70. P.L. 1977, ch. 564, § 86.
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The answer is yes and no. The legislature revised the statute in
1989 when it threw out the language that had been appearing since
1847 and added fourteen specific "factors" that a "court shall con-
sider... [when] determining an award of alimony."7 The factors
include post-divorce need; however, they also include the age of the
parties, the age of the marriage, the health, employment, and in-
comes of the parties, the tax consequences of the divorce, the
spouses' contributions to the household, economic misconduct, the
parties' standard of living, and "any other factors the court considers
appropriate."7
Nothing in the statute, however, identifies the actual purpose of
alimony. Need is no more important than any other factor, so the
statute hardly supports the Law Court's recent announcement that
reducing need is "the primary purpose of alimony." 73 In the final
analysis, the statute is so internally inconsistent that it is impossible
to deduce any single purpose of alimony. Consider.
o Factors D (parties' employment history and potential), G
(their retirement and health insurance benefits), and I
(their health) suggest awarding alimony to address the re-
cipient's post-divorce need;
o Factor B (the parties' ability to pay) suggests awarding ali-
mony irrespective of the recipient's post-divorce need;
o Factors K (the parties' contributions as homemaker) and L
(the parties' contributions to each other's earning poten-
tial) suggest awarding alimony to compensate for pre-di-
vorce beneficence;
o Factor M (economic misconduct) suggests awarding ali-
mony to compensate for pre-divorce malice;
o Factor 0 ("any other factors the court considers appropri-
ate") suggests that none of the fourteen enumerated factors
suggests the purpose of alimony.
74
71. See supra note 65.
72. See supra note 65; those hoping to incorporate Maine's new alimony statute
into a grand scheme of emerging alimony theory will be disappointed by the stat-
ute's theoretically impoverished origins. According to those drafters whom I have
interviewed, the statute was amended in response to a single divorce case. In that
case the husband had built up substantial earnings and earning power in a business
he would continue to operate after the divorce; the wife, on the other hand, had
served as homemaker almost all of the marriage and would leave the marriage with
few if any marketable skills. The trial judge, inexperienced in divorce law and espe-
dally ingenuous about alimony, denied her any alimony. The local community fun-
nelled its indignation into a proposal to amend the alimony statute. The legislature
acquiesced by producing a statute that reminds judges what they're supposed to
"consider" when they award alimony.
Here is the entire text of the statement of fact that accompanied the amendment:
"This bill enumerates the factors a court must consider when determining an ali-
mony award." L.D. 656, Statement of Fact (114th Legis., 1989).
73. Noyes v. Noyes, 662 A.2d 921, 922 (Me. 1995).
74. See supra note 65.
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Let me illustrate with the following example why it's impossible
to deduce the purpose of alimony from this statute:
You're standing in a field. A man approaches carrying a
bunch of big bulls-eye targets. He sets up the first one and
turns to you and says, "Consider this." He sets up a second
one, turns to you and says, "Consider this." As he sets up
each of the rest of the bulls-eye targets (coincidentally, fifteen
in all), he turns to you and repeats the same phrase. When
they're all set up and he's said the same thing as the last time,
he hands you a bow and a quiver full of arrows. Then he steps
back.
You look at the targets. Then you turn to him and say, "I'm
supposed to shoot at them, right?" He doesn't respond. You
say, "Is any one more significant than any other?" No answer.
"I'm a little out of practice-does it make any difference if I
miss one?" No answer. "Well, assuming that each is as impor-
tant as the other, is there some combination of them that I
should attempt?" No answer. "Are these my targets, or do
they merely frame a more distant objective?" No answer.
"Why should I shoot at any of them?" No answer. "What is
the purpose of this exercise?" No answer.
What is the purpose of considering the alimony factors? Is any one
of them more important than any other? If so, why? If not, why
not? If you hit upon a certain secret combination of the factors,
does the purpose of alimony magically appear? If the factors, singly
or in combination, outline the purpose of alimony, why doesn't the
statute simply tell us what it is rather than beating around the bush?
If, on the other hand, the factors don't tell us the purpose of ali-
mony, then why should we consider them at all?
We shouldn't. I know the statute mandates that we consider these
factors, and I hesitate to advise judges to violate any statute. But
I've considered them and considered them until I got blue in the
face, and I finally realized that what was frustrating me was the fact
that the statute doesn't mean anything. It requires us judges to con-
sider all sorts of things without ever telling us why we should do
so.75 Thus it mandates that judges award alimony arbitrarily be-
cause, if the definition of "arbitrary" is "determined by chance,
whim, or impulse, and not by necessity, reason, or principle,"76 this
statute never identifies the necessity, reason, or principle for award-
ing alimony. Having conscientiously studied the emperor and hav-
ing discovered that he is stark naked, I wonder why we should
participate in the ritual of contemplating his clothing.
75. The Law Court appears to agree with this assessment. In Noyes the court
cited Skelton as the authority on the purpose of alimony, not the statute. Noyes v.
Noyes, 662 A.2d at 922.





If Law Court precedent has inadequately analyzed the purpose of
alimony, and if our statute provides no analysis at all, do we have
any idea what we're supposed to be doing? The answer is that we
do, but we don't realize it. The Law Court holds the key to change
in its collective hand, but it's so anchored to the past that it virtually
can't admit it.
The recent Law Court decision in Noyes v. Noyes, proves the
point. In that case the parties were awarded unequal shares in the
marital property and the wife was awarded $2,000 alimony. The
wife appealed on the ground that the meager $2,000 alimony award
was inadequate because the parties left the marriage with unequal
earning capacities.
The Law Court agreed. The court opened with the usual cere-
mony, honoring its ancestors and genuflecting to the legislature:
The primary purpose of alimony is to provide "maintenance
and support" for the future needs of the payee spouse. Har-
ding v. Murray, 623 A.2d 172, 176 (Me. 1993) (quoting Skelon
v. Skelton, 490 A.2d 1204, 1207 (Me. 1985)). To determine an
alimony award, the trial court must consider the factors enun-
ciated in 19 M.R.S.A. § 721 (Supp. 1994)."78
Then the court got down to brass tacks:
[T]here is a substantial difference in the amount each is
presently able to earn.
Both parties are in their late forties. Linwood earns over
$15 per hour at Great Northern Paper Company. Although
he has earned as much as $44,000 as a result of extensive over-
time, his gross income in 1992 was $39,000. He receives medi-
cal and life insurance benefits from his employer, and is vested
in a noncontributory pension plan. At the age of 65, he will be
entitled to receive a lump sum payment of $12,576.56 or pay-
ments of $465.95 per month....
Sandra earns $5.60 per hour as a dietary aide in a boarding
home. In 1992, she earned $11,723 working forty hours per
week. After deductions, including costs of health insurance,
she takes home $680 per month. She has no retirement bene-
fits.... An alimony award premised on the assumption that the
spouse will invade her portion of the marital assets is insuffi-
cient. . . . "[I]t is inequitable to force a spouse to invade that
spouse's marital assets for the benefit of the other. Such a
concept defeats the presumably careful and equitable distribu-
tion of marital property." 79
77. 662 A.2d 921.
78. Id. at 922.




Two points. First, Skelton v. Skelton never said any such thing.
Not once in that decision did the court intimate, as it did in Noyes,
that the purpose of alimony is found in Maine's equitable distribu-
tion statute, the Marital Property Act; not once did Skelton even
mention marital property.8" Noyes's initial obeisance to Skelton is
spurious.
Second, the Law Court cannot mean what Noyes says. It says that
"[a]n alimony award premised on the assumption that the spouse
will invade her portion of the marital assets is insufficient."'" Con-
sider this example, however:
At the time of the divorce, husband earns $15 per hour and
expects to gross $39,000 per year. Wife, on the other hand,
earns $5.60 per hour and expects to gross $11,723 per year.
Wife gets 100% of the marital property, worth $250,000. She
also gets $1 per year of alimony.
If Noyes means what it says, the judge committed reversible error
because the wife will have to invade her portion of the marital assets
to support herself. Such a conclusion, however, is nonsense. The
total award proposed there plainly favors the wife. On the other
hand, if the judge refuses to give her any of the marital property or
alimony, no reversible error has occurred because there's no ali-
mony award at all, so alimony cannot have been "premised on the
assumption that the spouse will invade her portion of the marital
assets"2 (which doesn't exist either). This conclusion is as absurd as
the previous.
Let us assume, then, that Noyes's import lies not in the phrase
quoted in the previous paragraph but in this one: "[I]t is inequitable
to force a spouse to invade that spouse's marital assets for the bene-
fit of the other."8' 3 What that seems to mean is that if one spouse
has to use up marital property because the other isn't paying ali-
mony, the latter is enjoying an unfair "benefit." But that may not be
true either. Consider this example:
At divorce, both parties earn $5.60 per hour and expect to
gross $11,723 per year. They split the marital property, worth
$20,000, equally. Husband is fifty-five and of uncertain health;
wife is forty and in good health. Neither has health insurance.
Neither is awarded alimony.
80. In fact, the law at the time Skelton was decided was probably just the oppo-
site. See Smith v. Smith, 419 A.2d 1035, 1039 (Me. 1980): "There is no basis in the
marriage and divorce statutes of this State for supposing that the provisions for divi-
sion of property in section 722-A were intended to abrogate or limit the traditional
discretion of the trial judge to determine the amount of alimony as justice may re-
quire . ..."






If need were the controlling or "primary" consideration, the hus-
band might argue on appeal that he's entitled to alimony because
he's older and more likely to encounter medical expenses. But he's
unlikely to win on appeal because if he invades his marital property
he's not benefitting the other spouse. The reason is that the other
spouse could not have afforded to pay alimony in the first place and,
given her small income, might have to invade her marital property
too. The primary factor in this example isn't need, it's the ability to
pay and the equality of means. Where the ability to pay is meager
or the means of the parties equal, the significance of need is
diminished.
Finally, consider this example:
At divorce, husband earns $39,000 per year and wife earns
$11,723. They were married for 6 months before wife sued for
divorce. At the time of the divorce hearing their marriage is
nine months old. Their incomes haven't changed in the past
three years. There is only $12,000 of marital property which
the judge awards them in proportion to their incomes. Neither
is awarded any alimony.
Once again, if need were the "primary" issue the husband would
have to pay lots of alimony. But the marriage is so short that mak-
ing him do so seems unfair. The reason is that the disparity of the
spouses' incomes isn't the product of their marriage, so it isn't a fair
basis for awarding alimony.' The "primary" issue here is the
nonmarital source of the disproportion; need plays no role
whatsoevers 5
What, then, does Noyes really mean? At base, it recognizes two
kinds of assets: marital property and income. If one ex-spouse has
to invade marital property for his or her support and the other
doesn't because the latter earns more, that flags the possibility that
the order that divided all of the parties' assets, including income,
wasn't fair. If, as the result of the marriage, the parties' incomes are
disproportionate at divorce, either the spouse who earns more will
84. See e.g., Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAt_ L Rv. 3. 75
(1989):
We allow the wife a claim when she sacrifices her earning capacity to
advance her husband's. But where one spouse enters the marriage with a
great fortune or a lucrative talent, and the other has no similar asset, we
have a different situation. Divorce law cannot remedy all of life's inequali-
ties, and it is perfectly reasonable for such a couple to leave their marriage
as unequally endowed as they entered it.
Id.
85. By comparison, the parties in Noyes married in 1982, separated in 1990, and
were still married in 1995, because the first divorce hearing ended in a reversal by
the Law Court. Noyes v. Noyes, 617 A.2d 1036, 1037 (Me. 1992). By the date of the
second divorce hearing, in mid-1993, the husband had been working at the Bowater
paper mill for about 22 years. Id. at 1037. A substantial portion of his income at the
time of divorce must have been due to his employment during the marriage.
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have to pay alimony or the spouse who earns less will have to get
more marital property than the other. This is so unless there's a
good reason to the contrary such as equality of division of all assets
or inability to pay.86 The controlling principle doesn't look like
need at all; it looks like the equality of the division of marital prop-
erty and income.
It would be nice if the court just said that: the purpose of alimony
is to enable a divorce court to divide equally all of the assets of the
marriage, including the "career asset" of earning power.8
7
If so, then we have one important thing to be thankful for: what
guides the court is fundamental fairness. That means that, at least as
long as the Law Court retains principal authority for defining the
purpose of alimony, we are likely to be spared presumptive alimony
guidelines, those charts that purport to dictate the magnitude of an
alimony award in every divorce. 88 Assuming that I have at last fig-
ured out where the Law Court is going with alimony it would appear
that what defines the amount of alimony in every case is largely in-
ternal to the marriage (based on a computation of the value of the
assets, tempered by fair thinking) rather than imposed by table from
without. That's a relief because it means that we may continue to
explore the purpose of alimony without being tempted to abort the
inquiry for the reason that the guidelines have preempted it.
89
On the down side, however, is the inevitable uncertainty of devel-
oping case law. I am not confident that I know where the Law
Court is headed: that it continues to worship the decomposed idol
of Skelton is perplexing; that it refuses to acknowledge what it's ob-
viously doing is ominous.
Furthermore, there may be developing in the court a schizophre-
nia about the object of divorce itself. In Noyes the court found equi-
table reason for prolonging the spouses' post-divorce financial
86. The present alimony statute identifies many of the "reasons to the contrary."
See supra note 65. That doesn't change my opinion of the statute. If I'm right about
Noyes the statute may be considered to list the reasons why not to award alimony.
87. The term "career assets" was coined by Lenore Weitzman to describe things
like education and professional training, job seniority, employment security and fu-
ture earning capacity; things that are not "property" and therefore cannot be
reached through equitable division statutes but that have palpable value to those
who enjoy them. Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L.
REv. 1103, 1115 (1989) (citing LENORE WErrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION:
THE UNINTENDED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHIL-
DREN IN AMERICA 111 (1985)).
88. See, e.g., PA. R. CiV. P. 1910.16-3.
89. So long as we have a yardstick by which to measure how much alimony to
award, we are likely to refrain from asking why we should award it at all. The exist-
ence of precise, numerical standards blinds us to the deficiencies of policy. Thus we
risk repeating the error of our medieval ancestors, who found the Ptolemaic system
such a sufficiently accurate predictor of planetary motion that they didn't have to
question its objective truth.
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relationship, despite the trial judge's preference that it be curtailed.
Yet only three months earlier the same court had reversed a trial
judge, who had prolonged the spouses' post-divorce financial rela-
tionship, because such things should be curtailed. 90 In that case the
divorce judgment denied the wife alimony but entitled her to
"stumpage rights" 9 1 for ten years on the woodlot the court awarded
to the husband. The Law Court reversed, citing cases from three
other states for the proposition that "a court should endeavor to
divide the marital property in such a manner as to avoid continued
financial interaction between the parties." 92 Assuming for the mo-
ment that the court meant only to quash ex-spouses' bickering (be-
cause it stated, "l]t is particularly important to avoid creating
situations where the divorced parties remain in joint management of
income producing property."9 3), the decision makes perfect sense.
But if the court intended by that innocuous thought to introduce
Maine at long last to the clean-break theory of divorce-the idea
that whenever possible the parties' financial ties should be severed
finally at divorce'-then there's a theoretical tension about divorce
that needs to be relieved.
90. Berry v. Berry, 658 A.2d 1097 (Me. 1995). The trial judge who got reversed
was your humble author.
91. "Stumpage rights" means she had the right to cut and sell timber growing on
the property.
92. Berry v. Berry, 658 A.2d at 1099.
93. Id
94. See Reynolds, supra note 56, at 833-35.
The divorce reform movement of the 1960's. although largely focused on
the elimination of fault, sought to promote the role of property division
laws to address postdivorce need. The reformers' preference for property
division instead of alimony to address postdivorce need centered on one
feature: the different treatment accorded property division and alimony in
divorce litigation.... [Clommentators involved in the reform movement
apparently assumed that property awards would remain nonmodifiable and
extolled the virtues of property division as the superior means of making
economic adjustments at divorce largely on the basis of its
nonmodifiability.
The virtues of nonmodifiability have long been recognized.
Nonmodifiability brings finality at least to one aspect of the relationship,
and ending a source of controversy between the ex-spouses is certainly a
legitimate goal. Moreover, for psychological reasons, reformers have fa-
vored procedures that end as much contact between the parties as possible
in order to cut the emotional ties and leave the parties free to form other,
more enduring relationships.
Id.
See also John C. Sheldon, Toward a Coherent Interpretation of Maine's Marital
Property Act, 43 Mn. L. Rlv. 13,40 (1991): "[B]y adopting Section 307 [of the Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act, enacted in 1971 as Maine's Marital Property Act
[hereinafter MPA], Mu. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 722-A], Maine necessarily incor-
porated the objectives of that statute's drafters, including their goals for the use of
marital property instead of alimony."
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That tension is due to the fact that alimony prolongs financial ties.
Awards of marital property are normally final and unmodifiable,
whereas awards of alimony may normally be amended. 95 It is in-
compatible with the clean-break theory of divorce that alimony
serve as a basic constituent of divorce: if divorce is supposed to
sever the parties' financial ties completely, then alimony should only
be a last resort. Only when an award of marital property, dispropor-
tionate if necessary, fails to produce a fair result should a court
award alimony. The clean-break theory of divorce was a corner-
stone of the divorce revolution that produced, among other things,
no-fault divorce and the Marital Property Act in Maine.96
It would be consistent with the clean-break theory of divorce that
need serve as a sort of admission ticket to alimony. Alimony would
not be awarded unless somebody needed it: absent any need at all,
the clean-break theory of divorce applies. So if one party is a Car-
negie and the other is a Rockefeller, neither gets alimony irrespec-
tive of the division of marital property. On the other hand, alimony
might be awarded if a party might need it: if need exists then the
court has to pursue an equitable division of all of the parties' assets,
including earning power.97
95. Reynolds, supra note 56, at 834; Wardwell v. Wardwell, 458 A.2d 750 (Me.
1983) (citations omitted):
While statutory provisions relating to alimony and child custody ex-
pressly permit a divorce court to consider post-judgment motions for modi-
fication of an original divorce decree, the statutory provision relating to the
division of marital property contains no corresponding grant of authority.
In the absence of statutory authorization to modify a judgment dividing
marital property, the courts are without jurisdiction to do so.
Id. at 752.
96. See supra note 94.
97. Pennsylvania's experience with alimony is instructive. In 1988, Pennsylvania
amended its alimony statute to provide a list of "relevant factors" that "the court
shall consider" in order to determine "whether alimony is necessary, and in deter-
mining the nature, amount, duration, and manner of payment of alimony." 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3701(b) (1991). There are 17 factors and they include, at least
implicitly if not expressly, all of the factors listed in ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 721 (West 1994-1995), except the tax consequences of the division of marital prop-
erty (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721(H) (West 1994-1995)). Pennsylvania's stat-
ute does not include a discretionary catch-all similar to § 721(0) ("Any other factors
the court considers appropriate").
With a statute similar to ours, Pennsylvania takes a position on alimony similar to
that suggested here in the text: "[A]limony following divorce is a secondary remedy
and is available only where economic justice and the reasonable needs of the parties
cannot be achieved by way of an equitable distribution award and development of
an appropriate employable skill." Grandovic v. Grandovic, 564 A.2d 960, 965 (Pa.
Super. 1989) (citations omitted). See Patrick M. Coyne, The History of Alimony in
Pennsylvani" A Need for Further Change, 28 Duo. L. REv. 709 (1990).
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Need may serve a pivotal role in determining alimony if Maine
pursues a clean-break theory of divorce.9s Do we? Recent case law
isn't clear and I doubt that anybody knows. This means, I fear, that
we are unable to define even the purpose of divorce.
V. THE SPECrER OF CHANGE
And there remains, ever festering and ever growing, a deeper is-
sue:. why do we spend so much effort carving out special remedies
for divorcing spouses at all? Why do we keep distinguishing things
on the basis that the parties either were or weren't married? Every
time we do so, we extend increasingly antique concepts into an in-
creasingly changed world.
Consider this problem. In a 1991 divorce case the Law Court
said, "In equity and common sense, the fact that some of [the wife's
contributions] took place before the marriage or before the creation
of the joint tenancy' does not bar the court from weighing them in
its decision as to a just division of the house that it found was wholly
marital property."' 0 In a 1993 decision regarding the equitable par-
tition of real estate between two unmarried joint tenants, however,
the court declared:
[T]he division of property held in joint tenancy should take
into account all equities growing out of that relationship. Con-
tributions of the parties to the property prior to the joint ten-
ancy, however, are not equities growing out of the joint
tenancy relationship. To allow the consideration of contribu-
tions preceding the joint tenancy would defeat joint
ownership.'
0 '
Two diametrically opposed rules of law apply for two virtually iden-
tical circumstances, differentiated only by a wedding ceremony.lt 2
In the narrow sense, the 1993 decision was unwise because it pre-
vents judges from being fair. When a pair of unmarried joint ten-
98. I should point out that if this is so, need plays a role that has no relationship
to the role that need played under the tradition Skelton drew on: alimony addressed
one spouse's need because of the other's societal obligation of support. If need is an
admission ticket to alimony, it is a function of the clean-break theory of divorce,
which Skelton never considered and which the Law Court had never heard of when
it decided many of the cases that Skelton cited as authority for its holding.
99. Joint tenancy with right of survivorship means that each tenant owns the
property equally with all of the other tenants; upon the death of a tenant, that ten-
ant's interest in the property expires. See Maine Savings Bank v. Bridges, 431 A.2d
633 (Me. 1981).
100. Anderson v. Anderson, 591 A.2d 872, 874 (Me. 1991).
101. Boulette v. Boulette, 627 A2d 1017, 1018 (Me. 1993) (citations omitted).
102. In Boulette the parties had divorced previously, and Mrs. Boulette received
title to the property in the divorce judgment. She and her former husband later
reconciled, but they never remarried. During the period of reconciliation Mrs.




ants litigates to dissolve their tenancy, the judge is not allowed to
ensure that each gets credit for what might have been a valuable
pre-joint tenancy contribution to the property. That rule renders
the judge powerless to prevent the benefit of such a contribution
from devolving to an undeserving party.
In the broad sense, that decision creates a policy that limits fair-
ness arbitrarily to a particular class of people: married couples. If,
"in equity and common sense," it's unfair to deny spouses credit for
pre-joint tenancy contributions, it's no less unfair to deny unmarried
individuals the same thing. Or, to put it in another context, if it's
reversible error to require one ex-spouse to expend capital "for the
benefit of the other," why should we tolerate in policy the circum-
stance where one non-spouse expends capital that ultimately bene-
fits the other? °3
103. Professor Twila Perry has suggested that there are ominous sociological
overtones to the fact that alimony is available only to those who have married:
Let us take the example of two women, neither of whom has ever held a
job in her adult life. The first woman was married right out of college to a
young man with a promising career. The other woman never married but
had three children and ended up receiving public assistance. Both women
have been out of the workforce caring for their children at home for the
last several years. In one case, the husband has now decided that he wants
to end the marriage. In the other case, the government has decided to take
more severe measures against mothers receiving public assistance and to
force them into workfare programs.
.. . The former [woman] is viewed as having sacrificed her career in
order to spend time with her children, the latter is seen as just plain
lazy ....
... A woman who has been supported by a man for twenty years is seen
as deserving of continued economic support; a women [sic] who has been
supported by the government rather than by a man for the same period is
not. Both women may have been superb homemakers and wonderful, at-
tentive mothers, yet only one is viewed as deserving.
In short, we are willing to reward . . . women who have been "good
wives."
Perry, supra note 56, at 2500-2502 (footnotes omitted). To the extent that alimony
may be considered private welfare, the debate over reducing public welfare under-
mines the argument that alimony has a place in the modern world. To the extent, on
the other hand, that alimony derives from a concept of gender subordination in the
middle and upper class, id. at 2507, it turns into a remedy available exclusively to
women of means-which also dooms it, although for the reason of its social injustice
rather than of the combination of its exorbitant cost and incompatibility with the
work ethic. Thus, Professor Perry concludes:
Feminists must... recognize that the search for a theory of alimony also
reinforces privilege-or at least the image of privilege-in a group that is
predominately white and middle or upper-middle class, in a world where
women of color and other poor women often live lives of economic desper-
ation. To the extent that alimony reinforces the subordination of poor and





A worse policy cannot be imagined. These days, lots of people
build their dream home on one or the other's acreage and then
render a joint tenancy. Lots of them don't get married. Why does it
make a difference, when they break up, if they ever wedded or not?
It shouldn't, and as time goes by we look increasingly antiquarian by
maintaining that it does." 4
VI. CONCLUSION
What's the problem? Why can't we keep up? Why do we keep
propping up old shibboleths whose time has passed?
I have asked myself that question about Skelton a hundred times.
Why does the court keep citing Skelton as a basis for its decisions? I
guess that the jurisprudential explanation is that appellate courts
hesitate to overrule their precedents because they fear casting doubt
on the reliability of their decisions. So instead they miscite them, as
with Skelton, or they distinguish their precedents factually °5 or they
104. See JAMES A. SwEET & LARRY L. BUm'As. AmERIcAN FAMIUES AND
HOUSEHOLDS 10-11 (1987):
While the causes are not well understood, the propensity to marry has fluc-
tuated considerably over this century. Substantial deviations associated
with the depression of the 1930's and the demobilization following World
War II are evident .... Three main trends are evident: (1) a steady in-
crease in marriage rates from the low around 1930 to the postwar peak; (2)
a steady decline from this peak around 1947 until the early 1970's; and (3)
an acceleration in the rate of decline since then.
The authors conclude:
Marriage and family relationships seem to be occupying a shrinking
space in our lives. Marriage rates before age 25 have declined markedly, so
that young people spend a much larger proportion of their adult lives
before adopting marital obligations; it is possible that a significant propor-
tion may never do so. Parenthood is also being delayed, so that an in-
creased proportion of the early years of marriage is being spent in lifestyles
that are not defined in terms of the family roles that children bring. Again.
a substantial proportion of today's youth may never become parents at all.
Id. at 391.
105. In 1980 the Law Court decided that whenever a spouse deeds real property
titled in his or her name only to both spouses in joint tenancy, the property is "trans-
muted" into marital property. Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018 (Me. 1980) ("marital"
property is that which the divorce court has the discretionary power to award to
either party, or to split between the parties. as equity requires). Two years later,
however, the court limited Carter to "documentary transactions," and refused to
adopt Illinois precedent that "transmuted" real estate standing in the name of one
spouse only into marital property if the spouses spend their marital money to im-
prove real estate. I commented:
The Law Court ... spurned Illinois' analysis and rejected the argument,
stating that "[t]o permit nonmarital property to be 'transmuted' into mari-
tal property and thus to be subject to equitable distribution deprives a
spouse of nonmarital property contrary to legislative intent." One wonders
how the husband in Carter would have felt had he read that, and discovered
that the Law Court made not the slightest attempt to distinguish Carter on
other than the factual basis described above.
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ignore them completely. 1°6 This assures casting doubt on the relia-
bility of their decisions.
Sheldon, supra note 94, at 28 (quoting Hall v. Hall, 462 A.2d 1179, 1182 (Me.
1982)) (footnotes omitted).
106. See the discussion of Smith v. Smith, supra note 80; Smith is plainly incom-
patible with Noyes; however, the Law Court neither mentioned Smith nor addressed
that incompatibility in Noyes.
In Lalime v. Lalime, 629 A.2d 59 (Me. 1993), the Law Court addressed the trial
court's determination that certain real estate was "nonmarital" property. During
the marriage, the husband had deeded two parcels of real estate, previously owned
by himself alone, to himself and his wife as joint tenants. Under the Law Court's
previous interpretation of the MPA in Carter, this conveyance would ordinarily have
rendered the property "marital." See supra note 105. However, in this case the trial
court decided to declare the property nonmarital. Nonmarital property may be
awarded only to the titular claimant, so by declaring these parcels nonmarital the
trial court could only have awarded each party an undivided half-interest in each
parcel. In this case, the wife wanted a greater share of the real estate, and she ar-
gued on appeal that by declaring the parcels nonmarital, thereby depriving itself of
discretion over their disposition, the trial court erred as a matter of law.
A bare majority of the Law Court agreed with her. Writing for three other jus-
tices, Justice Dana disputed the trial court's factual basis for its legal conclusion that
the parcels were nonmarital. The trial court had believed the husband's testimony
that he had only transferred the parcels to himself and his wife jointly so that he
could obtain a loan. This, the trial court decided, was justification for declaring the
property nonmarital, because the husband had not intended by his transfer to en-
hance the "marital estate." The majority of the Law Court concluded that the hus-
band's testimony of his ulterior intention "does not constitute evidence." id. at 61,
that the property qualifies as nonmarital. Absent such evidence, the trial court was
obliged to follow the ordinary rule-that transfers of property into joint tenancy
during the marriage render the property marital. Thus, the Law Court concluded
that the trial court should have retained the power to dispose of the real estate at its
discretion.
TWo justices joined Justice Rudman in dissent. If prior case law meant what it
said, Justice Rudman argued, then the trial court had the authority to decide
whether the husband should be believed. According to such case law, the husband
had to present the trial judge with clear and convincing evidence that his transfer to
joint tenancy had not been meant to enhance the marital estate. If the husband did
that, then the trial court was supposed to declare the property nonmarital. Whether
the husband did that was an evidentiary conclusion that the trial court was supposed
to make on its own, and one that the appellate court had no right to disturb if there
was "competent evidence to support it." Id. at 62. Since there was abundant evi-
dence to support the trial judge's finding here, Justice Rudman voted to sustain the
original divorce judgment.
Neither the majority nor the dissent explained how their respective positions
would affect the Law Court's decision in Dubord v. Dubord, 579 A.2d 257 (Me.
1990). In Dubord the wife had contributed $20,000 of her nonmarital money to
contribute to the down payment on a house that she and her husband purchased
during the marriage. The trial court had relied on the transmutation rule in Carter
to declare the home marital. The Law Court, however, reversed on the theory that
transmutation applies only to transfers of nonmarital real estate interests from one
spouse to both spouses. Since Dubord involved the initial purchase of real estate by
the parties rather than an interspousal transfer, the Law Court ruled that transmuta-
tion did not apply. The wife's $20,000 contribution, along with whatever apprecia-
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That jurisprudential flaw is so obvious that I wonder whether
something deeper is at work. I wonder whether the ultimate issue
may be the fear of change, and whether Koestler, once again, pro-
vides a clue.
In the Ptolemaic universe, God was in the heavens. You could tell
by looking at them, because they never changed. The stars repre-
sented the divine ideal: perfect immutability. Only lower down on
the scale of existence was change encountered: in the solar sys-
tem-the motion of the sun, planets, and moon-and on Earth-
motion, life, death, and impermanence that was the curse of human
existence. To the ancients, change was synonymous with inferiority,
mutability with decay. 107
This distrust of change appealed to the Christian world. Axistote-
lian and Christian doctrines shared the view that "all change, all
generation and decay were confined to the immediate vicinity of the
earth."' 08 In this respect, the Ptolemaic system reinforced the
Christian dogma that all of human history proceeded from the Fall
of Man, a fall from perfection. And it explains why Ptolemy's sys-
tem proved so enduring: the sun revolved around the earth for as
long as it did because, so long as it did so, the seemingly motionless
and immutable stars remained a constant reminder of the omnipres-
ence of divine perfection, the perpetual foil to change and decay
tion it enjoyed in the form of a real estate investment, remained her nonmarital
property.
This ruling alarmed many students of family law because it substantially compli-
cated the divorce practice. Prior to Dubord, many practitioners and judges alike had
applied the theory of transmutation broadly to all post-marital interspousal transac-
tions in which the parties had commingled nonmarital funds. The advantage of this
practice was simplicity: at the time of divorce, the attorneys could prepare for trial
without having to trace through the marriage each spouse's percentage of ownership
of each piece of property to the purchase of which either spouse had made a contri-
bution from an arguably nonmarital source. Furthermore, the availability of trans-
mutation gave judges more freedom to pursue the equitable division of property
than they would have had if they had had to trace all nonmarital contributions. The
latter function, in complicated cases, could approach nightmare proportions and es-
calate litigation costs by inviting certain appeal. Dubord, which limited Carter to its
facts, put transmutation beyond the usual reach of practitioners and trial judges
alike, and threatened to snarl mercilessly the practice of divorce law.
Lalime, however, was a step in the other direction. By revitalizing transmutation
a majority of the Law Court reaffirmed the court's hostility to the tracing of assets
(an aversion that led the court to adopt transmutation in the first place) and commit-
ted itself to the simplification of divorce litigation. Unfortunately, however, neither
the majority nor the dissent even mentioned Dubord, let alone attempted to distin-
guish it. Thus, students of family law in Maine were left with the uncomfortable
knowledge that although four justices had distanced themselves from the effect of
Dubord none had expressed any interest in overruling it. It remains the law to this
day.
107. KoESTLER, supra note 1, at 57-58.
108. 1d at 292. Shakespeare emphasized this idea heavily. See supra note 61.
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here on earth.10 9 Kepler was magnetized by a similar conviction-
hence, a lifetime of salivating at the thought of the divinely perfect
universe. For centuries, humans aspired to and pursued perfection
as a balm to their abhorrence of change.
Is that what's at work in the late 20th Century? Is it a fear of
change that drives us to behave illogically? Do we tolerate purpose-
less rituals and contemplate vacuous statues in pursuit of security?
Perhaps the Law Court keeps running Skelton up the flagpole be-
cause the Justices simply fear admitting that the law should have
changed. Perhaps we treat the joint tenancy of a married couple
differently from that of an unmarried couple because we don't dare
face the fact that the couples are the same, that marriage doesn't
make a difference anymore-that a perfect ideal isn't ideal
anymore.
110
Maybe this will prove reassuring:
The history of American family life suggests that we need
not be disturbed by change in and of itself, because change-
and not stability-has been the norm. American families
have repeatedly had to change in order to adapt to novel cir-
cumstances-from challenges of New World colonization to
the commercial and industrial revolutions, enslavement, immi-
gration, depression, and war-and the changes that have
taken place in family structure, roles, and conceptions have
been so far reaching that they might be considered revolution-
ary. Nor do we need to worry obsessively about the increasing
diversity of family arrangements, since ethnic, religious, and
109. The appearance of a supernova in 1572 dented that idea. KOESMrR, supra
note 1, at 291-92. The discovery of sunspots-blemishes on a previously perfect
body-in 1612 was a further blow for the traditionalists. Id. at 433.
110. There is a sense that the nuclear family is such a time-honored ideal that
contemporary assaults on that institution must be recent, transitory, and therefore
inconsequential enough that they do not deserve the attention of the law. Such a
perception is false:
Because changes are so much more rapid now than they were, say, thirty
years ago, we are misled into thinking that they must have been caused by
something that has happened recently. WILLIAM J. GOODE, in WORLD
REVOLUTION AND FAMILY PATIrERNS (1968), has noted how family
changes tend to get compared to a fictional golden past. The truth of the
matter is that accelerating change stretches into the distant past.
Consider three critical dimensions of family change: marriage and mari-
tal stability, childbearing and parenting, and the roles of women. Each of
these is closely interrelated with the others, but the critical point is that
changes in all three have deep historical and cultural roots. The shrinking
dominance of family roles in the lives of men and women reflects the rela-
tive value our society places on these roles in comparison with other adult
roles. This, in turn, is a continuation of the reduction of family functions
over several centuries that has occurred with the transformation of our
economy, and with an associated increasing cultural value on individualism.
SwEET & BUMPAS, supra note 104, at 392.
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economic diversity has always been a defining characteristic of
American family life.'
That sanguine assessment takes the sting out of this one, no less
true:
[M]arriage as an ideal is less important today.... [P]ositive
values associated with voluntary singleness have become more
common, making marriage more of a choice than a necessity
among those who traditionally have been in the marriage mar-
ket. If this is true, marriage as a valued institution is indeed in
trouble and other forms of nonmarital living arrangements
may replace marriage in the future.'
1 2
The future is here. Unmarried cohabitation is common, and will
soon be as common as married cohabitation.' 3 Marriage is left with
one remaining, redeeming legal quality: it defines who's eligible for
the remedies of divorce. Absent marriage we don't know what kind
111. Mn, rz & KELLOGG, supra note 23, at 243.
112. Dennis K. Orthner, The Family Is in Transition, in THE FAMILY IN AMRICA
25, 27 (David L. Bender & Bruno Leone eds., 1992). See also SwEaT & ButMPAS,
supra note 104:
That the family is adaptive, and that family relationships continue to play a
very important role in the lives of Americans, are incontrovertible. At the
same time, it seems likely that the relative dominance of these relationships
in competition with other adult roles is likely to continue to dwindle over
the foreseeable future.
Id. at 401.
113. This is the basis for my dissatisfaction with most of the academic debate
about alimony. It presumes heterosexual marriage. This presumption dooms the
debate, because it ignores the larger question: Why limit alimony to divorce? Why,
for example, should we limit discussions of the economic efficiency of spousal spe-
cialization (the spouse with the greater earning power working, the spouse with the
smaller earning power home raising the kids) to cases of spouses? Consider this,
criticizing the "clean-break" theory of divorce:
The economic justification [for alimony] ... acknowledges what the early
reformers chose to ignore: that decisions about the allocation of work and
family responsibilities during marriage are likely to have economic conse-
quences that endure long after a marriage is formally dissolved. Thus, it is
neither realistic nor appropriate to expect instant rehabilitation or a clean
financial break.
Singer, supra note 13, at 2435. Assuming that Professor Singer is correct, his analy-
sis has nothing to do with marriage and everything to do with family. As this quota-
tion illustrates, the modern academic debate about alimony proceeds virtually
without any recognition of the fact that marriage and family are distinguishable.
Thus:
[T]he most dramatic change in the latter part of the 20th century has not
been a decrease in specialization within the nuclear family, but rather an
increase in specialization among women in the provision of child care and
other domestic services.
Id. at 2439 (footnote omitted). No, it isn't. The most dramatic change in the latter
part of the 20th century has been the demise of the heterosexual nuclear family. The
alimony debaters need to broaden their horizons. They have to consider why we
limit alimony to divorce, and why we don't recognize it for non-spouses. They have
to stop reading each other's law review articles and start reading the sociologists.
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of relationships qualify, upon termination, for alimony and the Mar-
ital Property Act remedy. But to tout marriage as a legal conven-
ience is, obviously, to condemn it as well, and also to condemn the
statutes that fail to address the ever-ballooning varieties of unmar-
ried relationships.
114
To those who would view this valedictory to marriage as heretical
of a timeless institution, I would reply that no human social institu-
To limit alimony to heterosexual spouses is also to ignore the growing trend to-
ward homosexual marriage and, necessarily, homosexual divorce. See THE EDITORS
OF THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 94 (1990):
Although the law denies all unmarried couples many legal and economic
privileges regardless of sexual orientation, the effect on same-sex relation-
ships is particularly troublesome. The law's seemingly evenhanded treat-
ment of unmarried couples in fact penalizes same-sex couples more
severely, because gay men and lesbians do not have the option of marriage.
Basic tenets of fairness should compel courts and legislatures to eliminate
laws and policies governing private law entitlements that discriminate
against same-sex couples, either by affording gay men and lesbians the
right to marry or at least by offering them those personal and economic
benefits that are vital to their welfare.
114. I intend the term "unmarried relationships" in the broadest sense, to include
not only those relationships that lack a wedding but also those with weddings that
the law doesn't recognize, especially homosexual "marriages." As homosexual mar-
riages become more common, the likelihood of their legitimacy increases. Consider
this, from the Ecumenical News International Bulletin:
Derek Rawcliffe, the former Anglican bishop of Glasgow and Galloway,
has told a BBC television programme that he is homosexual and has called
for a church blessing for gay couples. Rawcliffe ... is believed to be the
highest ranking Anglican cleric in Britain to state publicly that he is gay....
In his statement, Cardinal Hume [the leader of Roman Catholics in Eng-
land and Wales] said that it "is a fundamental human right of every person.
irrespective of sexual orientation, to be treated by individuals and by soci-
ety with dignity, respect and fairness." The church "has a duty to oppose
discrimination in all circumstances where a person's sexual orientation or
activity cannot be reasonably regarded as relevant," he said, adding that
"'homophobia' should have no place among Catholics."
Homosexuality 'Most Contentious Issue' Facing Churches, ECUMENICAL NEWS INT'L,
Mar. 14, 1995, at 3.
For a discussion of developing alternatives to marriage, see generally LAWRENCE
CASLER, PH.D., Is MARRIAGE NECESSARY (1974).
In one respect, Maine law already recognizes unmarried cohabitation. Maine has
two statutes that guide courts in determining rights and responsibilities for the chil-
dren of parents who live apart. One statute, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 214
(West Supp. 1994-1995), pertains to parents who never married. The other, ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 751 (West Supp. 1994-1995), pertains to parents who are
getting divorced. Space does not permit reproducing the statutes here for compari-
son, so the reader will have to accept my assurance that, in material part, the statutes
are identical. The implication of this fact is that, because Maine offers the same
remedies to parents irrespective of whether they married, Maine does not discrimi-
nate in favor of those parents who did. The further implication is that, in the field of




tion is timeless, and none should be considered so. Marriage has
been problematic for decades:
[M]arriage used to be an institution for the physical survival
and well-being of two people and their offspring. This func-
tion gave rise to a particular rule-governed structure suitable
to the situation. Today, except in time of war or accident, the
struggle for survival in industrialized societies does not require
purely physical strength. Instead, we have primarily the strug-
gle for psychological and emotional survival. The family unit
is the natural unit for human survival regardless of what the
hazard is. But so far, the changes in the structure, form, and
processes of marriage have been too few and too unsystematic
to cope with the new psychological and emotional problems.
Marriage still is an anachronism from the days of the jungle, or
at least from the days of small farms and home industries."
5
To those who would view this article as an heretical obituary of
the nuclear family, I will offer these personal observations. I was
raised in a 1950s American nuclear family: father commuting to
work in New York, mother raising three boys and tending home in
suburban New Jersey, milkman delivering quart bottles to the back
stoop daily. There were virtues: we never locked our doors, we
never heard of drugs, there were no missing children.
At the same time, there were peculiarities. Every day when I
walked home from school, I would pass black women waiting on the
street corners for the bus to take them home. These people were
maids who commuted every day to and from the black slums of
Newark to perform domestic work in homes in the white suburbs.
No black people lived in my neighborhood. No black people trav-
eled through my neighborhood unless they had specific business
there. When I was in seventh grade I took a trip with my junior high
school class to Washington, D.C.; we stayed in a Virginia motel with
this sign over the restaurant door: "Whites Only." Those of my
classmates who were girls had three basic, ultimate options: secre-
tary, schoolteacher, or homemaker, and, as my sixth grade teacher
expressly warned me, Harvard was graduating 500 Communists
every year.
We can't have our cake and eat it too. If we agree that racial and
gender segregation and McCarthyism have no place in our world,
we agree that the social values that produced those attitudes were
flawed. Those identical social values produced the concept of the
ideal nuclear family, the Ozzie and Harriet marriage. As our society
matures, it changes, and we leave behind the qualities-good and
bad-that we outgrow. There is no point in trying to retain those
qualities-they belong to the past.




The nuclear family belongs to the past; similarly, marriage seems
not long for the present. If we attempt to breathe life into those
ideals we will blunder just as thoroughly as did Nicholas Copernicus,
clinging desperately to his Aristotelian ideal. We must not merely
acknowledge change: we must tolerate it, accept it, and incorporate
it into the rules we formulate as law. We must keep up. I'm not
hopeful about the prospect that we can count on our legislature to
do so; they're probably the most Aristotelian body around." 6 So it
devolves to our courts to do the job to the extent that they are em-
powered." 7 Either we learn from Copernicus or we imitate him.
116. That is why I don't advocate amending the alimony statute to permit
palimony.
117. Alimony has always been considered a pure creation of statute. See Wood v.
Wood, 407 A.2d 282 (Me. 1979). It would therefore be presumptuous of courts to
attempt to revise the concept to apply to unmarried couples. However, I will point
out that, whereas the previous alimony statutes expressly limited the source of ali-
mony to "the estate of the other spouse," (see § 721 as it existed prior to the 1989
amendment), the present statute has no such limitation, and refers to each litigant as
a "party," not as a spouse. The implication is that alimony is a remedy that is not
limited to spouses, but that has been made available to all cohabitants.
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